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?? __init__.py(0 B)
?? __pycache__
?? execute.py(5.32 KB)
?? native.py(968 B)

Editing: execute.py

import asyncio
import json
import os
import stat
import tempfile

from defence360agent.contracts.config import Core
from defence360agent.hooks import native as native_hooks
from defence360agent.internals.logger import EventHookLogger
from defence360agent.model.event_hook import EventHook
from defence360agent.model.instance import db
from defence360agent.utils import run, snake_case

event_hook_logger = EventHookLogger()

def get_hooks(event):
    # if database is not available (i.e. direct RPC call), do not try to
    # load hooks
    if db.deferred:
        return []
    hooks = EventHook.select().where(EventHook.event == event)
    return list(hooks)

def _validate_hook_path(path, native=False):
    """Raise ValueError if path is not a safe hook file.

The original check rejected any path under /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm
    on the grounds that those dirs are world-writable. That blanket-
    by-prefix rule was too coarse: pytest's tmp_path lives under
    /tmp/pytest-of-<user>/... and the agent's own integration fixtures
    legitimately put hook files there. The real threats are (a) an
    attacker-owned file (DB row points at a path the attacker
    controls) and (b) a hook whose immediate parent is world-writable
    so the file can be swapped between this check and the exec.

The required permission bit differs between branches: subprocess
    hooks are exec'd by the kernel (needs X_OK), but native hooks are
    loaded via importlib's open()+exec_module path which only needs
    R_OK. A standard Python file in mode 0o644 is loadable but not
    executable, so requiring +x for native hooks would silently break
    the typical native-hook deployment (the `hook add-native` RPC has
    never required or documented an executable bit).
    """
    if not os.path.isfile(path):
        raise ValueError(
            "Hook path does not exist or is not a file: {}".format(path)
        )
    if native:
        if not os.access(path, os.R_OK):
            raise ValueError("Hook path is not readable: {}".format(path))
    else:
        if not os.access(path, os.X_OK):
            raise ValueError("Hook path is not executable: {}".format(path))
    real = os.path.realpath(path)
    try:
        st = os.stat(real)
    except OSError as exc:
        raise ValueError("Hook path stat failed: {}: {}".format(path, exc))
    # Reject world-writable files: any unprivileged user could rewrite
    # them between this check and the subprocess/importlib load.
    if st.st_mode & stat.S_IWOTH:
        raise ValueError("Hook path is world-writable: {}".format(path))
    parent = os.path.dirname(real)
    if parent and parent != "/":
        try:
            pst = os.stat(parent)
        except OSError as exc:
            raise ValueError(
                "Hook parent stat failed: {}: {}".format(parent, exc)
            )
        # A world-writable parent without the sticky bit means an
        # attacker can replace our hook by deleting+recreating the
        # file. /tmp itself has the sticky bit so renames are owner-
        # only, which is safe; pytest's tmp_path subdirs are mode 700.
        if (pst.st_mode & stat.S_IWOTH) and not (pst.st_mode & stat.S_ISVTX):
            raise ValueError(
                "Hook path has world-writable parent without sticky bit"
                " {}: {}".format(parent, path)
            )

async def execute_hook(path, data, native=False):
    try:
        # Path validation runs filesystem syscalls (isfile/access/realpath)
        # which can block the event loop on slow/NFS storage; defer to a
        # threadpool executor. The same checks apply to native hooks
        # because native_hooks.execute_hook imports the file via importlib
        # straight in the agent's root process — a DB-sourced /tmp path
        # there is at least as dangerous as a subprocess fork.
        loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
        await loop.run_in_executor(None, _validate_hook_path, path, native)
        if native:
            native_hooks.execute_hook(path, data)
            exit_code, err = 0, None
        else:
            data = json.dumps(data).encode()
            cwd = os.path.dirname(path)
            exit_code, _, err = await run(
                [path], shell=False, input=data, cwd=cwd
            )
    except Exception as e:
        exit_code, err = None, repr(e)

return exit_code, err

async def execute_hooks(event, tempdir=Core.TMPDIR):
    dump = event.get("DUMP")
    params = dict(event)
    hooks = get_hooks(event.event)

if not hooks:
        return

with event_hook_logger(event.event, event.subtype) as event_logger:
        if dump:
            prefix = snake_case(event.__class__.__name__) + "_"
            tmp = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
                mode="w+", prefix=prefix, suffix=".json", dir=tempdir
            )
            json.dump(dump, tmp)
            tmp.flush()
            os.fsync(tmp.fileno())
            params["tmp_filename"] = tmp.name

data = {
            "event": event.event,
            "subtype": event.subtype,
            "params": params,
        }

for hook in hooks:
            with event_logger(hook.path, native=hook.native) as hook_logger:
                hook_logger.begin()
                exit_code, err = await execute_hook(
                    hook.path, data, native=hook.native
                )
                hook_logger.finish(exit_code, err)

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